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The Constitution of the Roman Republic: A Political Economy Perspective
Eric A. Posner1
October 31, 2010

Abstract. The constitution of the Roman Republic featured a system of checks and balances that
would eventually influence the American founders, yet it had very different characteristics from
the system of separation of powers that the founders created. The Roman senate gave advice but
did not legislate; the people voted directly on bills and appointments in popular assemblies; and a
group of magistrates, led by a pair of consuls, proposed bills, brought prosecutions, served as
judges, led military forces, and performed other governmental functions. This paper analyzes the
Roman constitution from the perspective of agency theory, and argues that the extensive checks
and balances, which were intended to prevent the recurrence of monarchy, may have gone too far.
Suitable for an earlier period in which the population was small and the political class was
homogenous, the constitution proved unworkable when Rome acquired a vast, diverse empire.
The lessons of Roman constitutionalism for the American constitution are also discussed.

The Roman Republic, which is conventionally dated from 509 to 27 B.C.,2 had an
unwritten constitution that controlled its political system. The constitution established a series of
institutions (such as the senate) and offices (such as the two consulships), and defined their
powers; it determined the rights of citizens and eligibility for citizenship; it addressed the role of
religion in public life; it specified proceedings for lawmaking and adjudication. There was no
formal amendment procedure, so constitutional norms changed frequently and often
imperceptibly (as in Britain), and the constitution evolved a great deal over almost five hundred
years. But there was a fair degree of continuity, and ancient authors recognized the difference
between constitutional norms and other legal and political norms, making modern identification
of a Roman constitution possible.
The modern scholarship on the Roman constitution is mainly descriptive and historical,
with some speculation about how particular norms may have contributed to the prosperity and
stability of the Republic, and others may have contributed to its collapse. Historians generally
observe that Roman constitutional norms mediated between an upper class and the masses, and
distributed executive power among multiple offices in order to forestall a return to the
monarchical system that existed in the sixth century B.C. No one has tried to analyze the Roman
constitution within a modern political economy framework, however, and the purpose of this
paper is to develop such an analysis.
The central idea of this framework is that of agency costs. Constitutions do many things
but all constitutions manage agency costs. The people (the principal) assign government
officials (the agents) the task of supplying public goods and redistributing wealth. The agents
1
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have interests that are not fully aligned with those of the people; the purpose of a constitution is
to give agents incentives to act in the interests of the people, that is, to minimize agency costs. A
large literature discusses the way that elections, judicial review, separation of powers, and other
modern political institutions may (or may not) minimize agency costs.3 I address the Roman
constitution from this perspective, examining ways that Roman institutions might have
minimized agency costs that existed in the ancient world. I do not claim that the Roman
constitutional system was optimal or efficient; my more modest goal is to describe ways in
which the system may have addressed the problem of agency costs, albeit frequently in imperfect
or questionable ways.
The most notable feature of the Roman system from a modern perspective was the
elaborate set of precautions against the accumulation of executive power in a single person. The
goal was to prevent the recurrence of monarchy but the risk of checks and balances is that they
paralyze governance. I argue that gridlock did not occur during the Republic’s first four
centuries because the population was relatively small and homogenous, so political agents could
bargain around the institutional checks and balances when necessary for the sake of public
security. But as conquered foreign populations streamed into the city, the population became
large and heterogeneous. Most of the fabulous wealth resulting from conquest enriched the
elites, not ordinary people, resulting in divergence of interests between the upper and lower
classes. Governance became subject to gridlock, setting the stage for extra-constitutional
behavior in the last century and eventually dictatorship.
There are three reasons why such an analysis contributes to the literature. First,
classicists have been cautious about speculating about the functions of the Roman constitution
because of the paucity of sources. Nonetheless, they have tried to make inferences which reflect
informal rational choice reasoning but without, as far as I can tell, any knowledge of the vast
modern literature on political economy. One purpose of this paper is to bring to bear recent ideas
from one discipline on the discussions of specialists in another.
Second, the Roman constitution has influenced modern political institutions. American
revolutionaries (and, subsequently, French revolutionaries) were obsessed with ancient Rome.4
References to the heroes and villains of ancient Rome are ubiquitous in founding-era pamphlets,
letters, orations, and books. Publius wrote the Federalist Papers, the veterans of the
Revolutionary War created the Society of Cincinnatus, etc., etc. A more fine-grained
understanding of the Roman constitution will contribute to our understanding of the founders’
constitutional thinking and to constitutional theory in general.
Third, modern constitutional legal theory has taken a comparative turn, and a new, rich
literature has produced rigorous accounts of foreign constitutions, often from the perspective of
rational choice.5 One benefit of this approach is that it helps stimulate ideas for constitutional
3
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design and evolution in the United States. The Roman constitution provides a fresh example,
which is notable because of its stark differences from modern constitutional systems.
Before I turn to the analysis, I need to offer more than the usual number of caveats. The
secondary literature contains many internal disagreements about the meaning of sources, which
are themselves extremely sparse and not always to be trusted. Only the final years of the
Republic are well-documented, thanks in large part to Cicero’s private letters to his friends, and
the survival of speeches and other contemporary materials. For earlier periods, historians rely
mainly on Polybius, who was a foreigner with a foreign perspective and a particular ideological
and philosophical agenda; Livy, who relied on earlier historical sources that are now lost, and,
writing in the Augustan age, needed to avoid making claims that would have displeased
Augustus; and mostly ambiguous archeological evidence. Augustus, Rome’s first emperor, and
later republicans like Cicero idealized the old days and emphasized the decadence of the late
republic period—Cicero to justify a return to an era supposedly dominated by the elites,
Augustus to justify his abolition of late republican institutions.
In order to make progress with a political economy analysis, I will have to engage in
extreme simplification. My claims about Roman constitutional norms should all be taken in this
spirit; because I will not reproduce the controversies in the literature, interested readers will need
to consult the sources.
On top of the problem of interpreting old sources that could be self-serving and that are
rife with gaps, there is the problem of interpreting an unwritten constitution. Even with a
modern system such as Britain’s, it is never entirely clear when a norm is constitutional or
merely legal. In such cases, claims about the meaning of the constitution are hard to separate
from ideological or self-interested wishful thinking—as is, of course, even the case with written
constitutions. However, that Rome did have a constitution, and that Romans themselves
believed themselves to have a constitution, is not open to serious doubt6—at least, until the last
century of its existence.7
In addition, it is impossible to identify a single Roman constitution over the five hundred
year period of the Roman Republic.8 There was significant change and disruption during this
period. During its last century, the Republic was in a state of nearly continuous crisis and
sometimes civil war. The secondary sources that describe the Roman constitution focus on the
third and second centuries B.C., when the political order was relatively stable, while also
identifying norms that persisted over time and some historical variation during other periods,
especially the final fifty years. I follow them but deemphasize the historical variation, which is
complex and elusive.9
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I. A Thumbnail Sketch of the Roman Constitution
The U.S. constitution embodies a system of separation of powers, with a presidency that
executes the laws, a Congress that legislates, and a judiciary that interprets the laws. Federalist
structures guarantee some autonomy for states. The source of authority is the people who can
amend the constitution by following prescribed procedures. The Roman system is quite
different. Most scholarly discussions divide it into three main elements: the senate, the
magistrates, and the assemblies. The senate is politically important as the locus for political
discussion but has mainly advisory powers in a formal sense. The magistrates have the major
executive and administrative powers, but also serve as judges, and initiate legislation by
summoning assemblies of the people and submitting bills to them for their approval. The people,
acting in assemblies, pass bills, elect magistrates, and serve certain judicial functions. Roman
provinces had no autonomy but were governed by representatives of the government. Table 1
provides an overview of the Roman Constitution as it existed in the mid- to late Republic. The
information provided is approximate, and will be discussed in more detail in the text below.

Table 1: The Roman Constitution
Institution
Senate

Magistrates
(number by
end of
Republic)

Consul (2)
Praetor (16)
Quaestor
(40)

Assemblies

Eligibility
Former
magistrate;
good
character
Former
praetor
Former
quaestor
Citizen

Term
Lifetime

Powers
Advisory; finances

One year

Plebeian

One year

Plebeian

One year

Military command; head of state; power to
convene assemblies and propose legislation
Military command; judicial authority; power to
convene assemblies and propose legislation
Public finances; assistants to other magistrates;
power to convene assemblies and propose
legislation; public prosecutors
Power to convene assemblies and propose
legislation; intercessio
Public infrastructure, games

One year
One year

Tribune
(10)
Plebeian
Aedile (2)
Curule
Aedile (2)
Censor (2)

Citizen

One year

Public infrastructure, games

Citizen

Five years

Dictator

Citizen

Six months

Centuriate

Citizen

Ad hoc

Tribal

Citizen

Ad hoc

Plebeian

Plebeian

Ad hoc

Maintaining census; enrolling senate; public
contracts
Maintaining order in emergencies; appointed on an
ad hoc basis
General legislation; elected consuls, praetors, and
censors; capital trials
General legislation; elected other magistrates;
trials
General legislation; trials

A. The Senate
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The senate was the central institution in Roman politics, but its formal powers were few.
It did not pass legislation or appoint magistrates, for example. As a matter of formal
constitutional law, the senate was mainly an advisory institution whose members received
delegations, digested reports, debated, and issued decrees, which were not legally binding.10
Nonetheless, in practice the senate had a considerable degree of authority during most of its
existence. Over the last one hundred years of the Republic, the senate lost power to magistrates
with popular followings.11
The senate’s decrees did not have formal legal force, but they frequently guided
subsequent legislation enacted by the plebeian assembly, which was the main legislative body.12
Magistrates needed the support of the senate because the senate consisted of important,
experienced men.13 The senate also provided a forum in which the magistrates divided authority
among each other so as to avoid jurisdictional conflicts.14 The senate received delegations from
foreign countries and negotiated treaties with them, and had a significant role in public
finances.15
Magistrates summoned the senate for meetings and set the agenda.16 A magistrate made
a proposal and asked the senate’s advice. Senators were supposed to debate the issue presented
by the magistrate but could digress. Filibusters were possible because the meeting had to be
ended at nightfall. Eventually, the presiding magistrate called for a vote on his proposal (for
example, that a decree be issued), and the senators voted for or against. The motion could be
vetoed by a tribune or a magistrate of equal or greater rank. If a decree survived the veto, it was
recorded.
The membership of the senate varied over time, but it was always in the hundreds.
Because senators were often absent, meetings could take place in the low hundreds.17 Senators
were not subject to a formal property qualification but probably had to have substantial property
(or belong to a family that did) in order to hold office.18 For one thing, they were not paid and
were barred from commercial activities.19 For another, they were drawn from the ranks of
magistrates (also unpaid), who needed substantial resources to win electoral campaigns and
10
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discharge some of their duties (for example, aediles were expected to finance the games).20
Senators were appointed by consuls earlier in the Republic and by censors later in the Republic.
As noted, they were typically ex-magistrates. Censors determined that an individual possessed
good moral character before appointing him to the senate; censors could also remove senators
who had engaged in gross moral turpitude, including serious crimes. Otherwise, senators served
for life.21
B. Offices
Day-to-day governance occurred through the magistrates. The major magistrates were
the consuls, praetors, tribunes, aediles, and censors. Each office had more than one occupant, as
discussed below. Each type of magistrate possessed authority over a different area of life; their
authority included executive, legislative, and judicial powers, as we understand them today.22
Madison, following Montesquieu, warned that breach of separation of powers was a recipe for
tyranny.23 But the Roman magistrates were subject to significant checks. Their terms were
short; they were elected by the people (in most cases); they had to obtain the approval of the
people for certain actions such as legislation; they could be tried and punished for abuse of their
office after their term has expired; and they were constantly subject to public scrutiny because
they had to act publicly in most cases.24 They could act independently but some amount of
cooperation was necessary so that they did not undermine each other’s actions; in addition,
magistrates could veto actions of other magistrates of equal or lesser rank as long as the vetoing
magistrate was present.25 All of the magistracies were open to plebeians as well as patricians by
the mid-Republic.26 Magistrates could and often did simultaneously serve as senators, akin to
the parliamentary system and unlike the American system of separation of powers.27
1. The Magistracies: Powers
a. Consuls
The chief magistrate was the consul. In fact, two consuls were in office at the same time.
The consul’s term was one year. Until Sulla reformed the office in 81 B.C., the consul’s major
role was as military commander. Thus, the two consuls would leave the city in order to conduct
military campaigns.28 Before leaving the city and after returning to the city, the consul
performed a number of civilian functions. He might conduct elections of other officials such as
censors; he might discuss issues in the senate; he might propose legislation; he might preside
20
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over certain trials as judge; he could appoint a dictator (although the senate appears to have had
some role in this appointment as well29). After 81 B.C., consuls’ military role was
deemphasized. Others (often called proconsuls) were appointed to conduct military campaigns,
and consuls stayed in Rome and discharged their civilian duties. Consuls could veto each other’s
actions but preferred to cooperate.30 To avoid conflict, consuls took turns holding the power to
set the agenda, alternating by month.31
b. Praetors
Praetors were junior to consuls but nonetheless very powerful magistrates as well. They
also served single one-year terms.32 Originally, there was only one praetor; the number was
increased to two around 242 B.C.; in 81 B.C. the number appears to have been increased to eight
by Sulla. By the end of the Republic, the number had been increased to sixteen.33 Praetors had
most of the functions of the consul but not all—for example, they could not appoint dictators.
They were junior to consuls so they had to step aside when consuls rejected their policies or
actions. Praetors served as governors of provinces, military adjuncts to consuls, or military
commanders. By the mid- to late Republic, all praetors had judicial functions. 34 They presided
over civil and criminal trials, which gave them the ability to influence the outcomes, though
verdicts would be rendered by juries. Many such trials touched on questions of official
misfeasance.35
c. Tribunes
Tribunes, unlike consuls and praetors, could only be plebeians, and were elected by
plebeians.36 By the late Republic, ten tribunes served one-year terms. Tribunes were understood
to serve the plebeians’ interests and to defend them against the patricians.37 They presided over
plebeian assemblies that could legislate and conduct certain political prosecutions, and had the
important power to obstruct or veto proceedings in other bodies. Tribunes could prevent the
senate from convening, veto senate decrees, and stop other magistrates from performing their
duties (“intercessio”) such as proposing legislation or taking actions against citizens such as
arrests and prosecutions. Their right to intercede was not absolute, but its contours were
uncertain.38
d. Aediles
There were two pairs of aediles, plebeian and curule, who were elected in different ways,
as discussed below. However, the two types of aediles had similar functions. They had
29
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responsibility for maintaining public buildings such as temples, streets and the water supply, and
public order. They staged the public games. They also served as prosecutors in trials involving
public law.39
e. Quaestors
Quaestors dealt with public finances. Urban quaestors managed the public treasury,
making payments and pursuing tax and other obligations.40 Consular quaestors managed army
pay and finances.41 The number of quaestors increased from four in 421 B.C. to 40 in 45 B.C.;42
they served one-year terms. Quaestors were assigned to particular administrative posts, for
example, for a province.43 Some were assistants to other magistrates. Quaestors were assigned
by the senate, presumably in consultation with the senior magistrates.44
f. Censors
Censors kept track of the Roman people and their property. The two censors had terms
that varied over the history of the Republic, but lasted around five years in the last two
centuries.45 In addition to conducting the census—that is, counting up the people, ranking them
by property holdings, and determining their tribal membership—censors passed judgment on
them. People who had showed cowardice in battle, or did not cultivate their lands, or committed
some serious crime or moral offense, might be condemned by the censors, in which case they
could not serve in the Senate or occupy important offices. Censors also entered public contracts
on behalf of Rome, both for public works and for taxation.46
g. Dictators
Unlike the other offices, the dictatorship was a temporary position (sometimes six
months) that was created in emergencies. The dictator was appointed (technically, nominated)
by the consul (and/or the senate); sometimes he was popularly elected.47 The dictator was given
military command for the purpose of addressing a military threat or suppressing a rebellion. The
authority of the dictator may have been absolute, or it may have been subject to some limitations
(including the tribune’s veto). He also may have had to share some de facto authority with his
second-in-command, the separately appointed Master of the Horse. But clearly he was the
supreme leader while in office. The dictatorship was not used after the Second Punic War ended
in 201 B.C., until Sulla in 81 B.C. and Caesar beginning in 48 B.C. During this period, the
Senate used other devices to authorize consuls to take extraordinary action against threats.48
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h. Other Magistrates and Officials
There were numerous lower-ranked magistrates, most of them elected for one-year terms
or approved on an ad hoc basis. They performed various functions, for example, distributing
lands, serving as judges in trials, cleaning roads, and managing the mint.49 Religious officials
were also important. The pontifex maximus headed the College of Pontiffs, the most important
religious body in ancient Rome. It had control over sacred spaces, public religious rituals,
aspects of family law, and the calendar.50 The pontifex maximus was often a politician who was
not necessarily pious (Julius Caesar, for example), and the powers of that office could be used
for political purposes—for example, to adjust the calendar so as to extend a consul’s term of
office.51 Other religious officials had the power to delay assemblies and other state functions for
religious purposes.
Unlike in most modern systems, political officials often had religious functions. Before
calling assemblies, consuls were required to consult the augurs, who would examine the flights
of birds, the entrails of sacrificed animals, and other signs of divine favor or displeasure. Augurs
could delay or nullify political actions if the omens were not auspicious. Some evidence
suggests that the political class manipulated these religious rites for political effect. Cicero, for
example, says that magistrates might adjourn an assembly citing unfavorable portents if they
detected a disordered mood among the crowd or believed that the assembly would be politically
“useless.”52
Provincial governors should also be mentioned. These officials had extraordinary power,
including military power. They were not subject to restrictions the way that magistrates in Rome
were, except they could be relieved of their positions and prosecuted for serious misconduct.
One of Cicero’s earliest victories as a lawyer was over Gaius Verres, the former governor of
Sicily, whom he prosecuted for corruption. The earliest provincial governors were praetors;
later, provincial governorships were given for one year to consuls and praetors at the end of their
term.
2. Eligibility and Elections
A law of 180 B.C. prescribed certain qualifications for obtaining the senior offices. One
had to hold the quaestorship before becoming a praetor, and the praetorship before becoming a
consul. (This was known as the cursus honorum.53) Offices could not be held consecutively but
at two-year intervals. There were also age requirements: 30 before becoming a quaestor, 36
before becoming an aedile, 39 before becoming a praetor, and 42 before becoming a consul. The
tribuneship did not play a role in the cursus honorum because it was open only to plebeians. The
other offices were presumably deemed insufficiently important to serve as prerequisites to higher
positions.
49
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All of the offices I have discussed were filled by election except for the dictatorship,
which was normally filled by consular (or senatorial) appointment. Consuls, praetors, and
censors were elected in the centuriate assembly. Quaestors were elected in the tribal assembly.
The plebeian aediles were elected in plebeian assemblies presided over by the tribune, while the
curule aediles were elected in tribal assemblies presided over by a consul or praetor.54 The
pontifex maximus was at some times elected by a popular assembly and at other times appointed
by the college of pontiffs.55 Most of the offices were open to plebeians as well as patricians.
Earlier in the Republic many offices were barred to plebeians, but these prohibitions were
eliminated over time.56 Some of the offices (the tribune, at least one of the consuls, at least one
of the censors) were open only to plebeians.57 There were two plebeian aediles; the two curule
aediles could be either plebeian or patrician.58 However, consuls were proposed by the senate,
and the senate normally (although not always) proposed consuls from the ranks of the patricians
who dominated that body.
Recall that senators were not elected. However, because senators were drawn from the
ranks of former elected officeholders, and because they were selected by elected officials such as
consuls and censors (also by two dictators, Sulla and Caesar), popular elections indirectly
influenced the composition of the senate as well.
There was no formal property requirement to be a magistrate,59 but only wealthy people
could have afforded to be a magistrate. Magistrates did not draw a salary and some of them were
expected to finance their public tasks out of their own pocket. For example, aediles paid for the
games.60 Other magistrates with access to the public treasure were expected to post security
using their own funds.61 And election campaigns were expensive. Candidates could obtain
contributions or loans from others, but spent a great deal of their own money as well in order to
secure election.62
C. Legislation (Herein, Assemblies)
Laws were enacted through the joint action of a magistrate and an assembly.
Magistrates—consuls, praetors, aediles, tribunes, or dictators—summoned assemblies and
proposed bills. Because assemblies did not follow a calendar, notices of meetings were posted
in advance. The assembles met in public spaces chosen by the magistrate or determined by
tradition. Because so many different officials could call assemblies, there was a danger of
54

For a comprehensive discussion of the eligibility and electoral requirements of magistrates, see Abbott, supra, at
169-70, 171. Assemblies are discussed, infra.
55
Lintott, supra, at 184.
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60
Abbott, supra, at 205-06.
61
Nicolet, supra, at 4.
62
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conflict—that multiple assemblies would be called at the same time. However, there was a rule
that once an assembly began, another assembly could not be summoned; further, consuls could
take over the assembly summoned by another magistrate, as could praetors unless the assembly
was summoned by a consul.63 Magistrates asked members of the assembly for their opinions but
the latter had no right to speak.64
Legislation required the summoning of two types of assemblies. In the contio, speeches
were made and debate occurred, but there was no voting. These assemblies were relatively
informal; nonvoters such as slaves and women attended.65 After the contio was dissolved, voting
took place in the comitia. This second type of assembly was regimented.66 Voters collected in
an area organized into voting units (tribes or centuries) and marched forward to cast votes orally
or (later) by using ballots.67
In the middle and late Republic, there were two major types of comitia: comitia
centuriata (centuriate assemblies) and comitia tributa (tribal assemblies).68 Centuriate
assemblies were organized into centuries, groups of men ranked by wealth.69 The organization
had its origin in military structure: wealthier men who could purchase horses and armor belonged
to the century with the highest rank (equites); slightly less wealthy men who could afford only
armor held the next highest rank; and so on, down to men who could afford only light weaponry
like slings. The smaller number of wealthy people were dispersed among a larger number of
centuries than poorer people were; thus, the equites (which were essentially officers) and the first
class of pedites (the wealthiest of the five classes of enlisted men) composed a majority of the
total number of centuries, and thus could determine voting outcomes if they were united, even
though these people were less numerous than the membership in the other four classes of
pedites.70
Tribal assemblies were based on tribal membership. Every Roman citizen belonged to a
tribe, which was essentially an arbitrary division of the Roman public based on ancient and
probably fictive kinship groupings.71 People inherited their tribal status from their fathers,
except for freedmen who were generally shunted into the overpopulated urban tribes.72 Voting
took place by tribe. If a majority of a tribe supported a bill or other measure, then that tribe was
deemed a yea vote; the measure passed if a majority of tribes supported it. The centuriate and
tribal assemblies included men of both classes—patricians and plebeians—but there was also a
separate type of tribal assembly known as the plebeian assembly that included only plebeians and
was presided over by the tribune.73
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Both types of assembly had general legislative powers in principle, but in practice the
plebeian assembly enacted the bulk of legislation. The centuriate assembly alone had the power
to declare war and certain other powers related to military organization; it also elected consuls,
praetors, and censors; and it conducted trials where the punishment was death.74 The tribal
assembly voted on general legislation and elected other magistrates. In some situations, the
tribes voted simultaneously, but in legislative assemblies the tribes voted sequentially, with the
results of each vote announced before the next. The order of voting was determined by lot.75
The account so far might give a misleading impression that the system for enacting
legislation was highly democratic, even biased in favor of the lower class. As noted, most
legislation was enacted by plebeian assembly, from which patricians were excluded; and the
plebeian tribune, acting on behalf of the plebeians, could veto legislation in the centuriate and
tribal assemblies where the patricians could vote.
However, several factors favored the patricians. First, the senate, which was dominated
by patricians, and the chief magistrates, who were usually patricians, set the legislative agenda.
Second, plebeians wealthy and successful enough to become tribunes surely found that their
interests had become aligned with those of the patricians, who sought to conserve Roman
traditions and maintain the existing distribution of property. Third, the assemblies were not
entirely democratic in character. In the centuriate assembly, people were assigned to centuries
on the basis of wealth, and the wealthier centuries had priority in voting.76 In the tribal
assembly, the urban tribes were overpopulated with the poor (including recently freed slaves).77
Thus, the urban tribes could be outvoted by the less populated rural tribes which were dominated
by landowners. On the other hand, members of the urban tribes were more likely to be present,
and sheer numbers and the ever-present threat of mob violence, must have made a difference.78
Many patricians, notably Clodius (who actually transformed himself into a plebeian by
engineering his “adoption” by a plebeian), came to power by promising to redistribute wealth to
the poor, and used the mob effectively.79 Fourth, as a practical matter, only wealthy people
could afford to be magistrates.80 Some positions—for example, judicial offices after 123 B.C.—
became the monopoly of the knightly class (equites).81 Fifth, the demos excluded women and
slaves, and slaves were a large majority of the population. It also excluded conquered peoples up
until the Social War of 91-89 B.C., after which people living on the Italian peninsula (but by no
means all conquered people) gradually were granted citizenship.82
D. Administration
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Administrative functions were fulfilled by the magistrates. The senate and the assemblies
played no role. The magistrates had almost complete administrative discretion outside of
Rome—in the case of military commands and civilian leadership positions in provinces.83
Checks were political and judicial. Magistrates checked magistrates of equal and junior rank;
tribunes could check all magistrates; and the senate exercised influence over magistrates as
well.84 Magistrates could also be sued for violating Roman law.
Inside Rome, the story was different. As we have seen, aediles, quaestors, and censors
had responsibility for different aspects of municipal administration—aediles, for public works
and games; quaestors for public finances; and censors for government contracts. Numerous
minor magistrates had other responsibilities—conducting executions, watching for fires, and so
forth.85 They had to cooperate with each other, and with the tribunes, who could often obstruct
their activities, and presumably with consuls and praetors as well.86
Although the magistrates were assisted by clerks, secretaries, and other personnel, the
bureaucracy was tiny by modern standards. The city limits of Republican Rome had a
population in the hundreds of thousands, but did not have a police force or a prison system.87
The huge bureaucracy associated with ancient Rome was not developed until the later Empire.88
In the Republic, the weakness of the administrative system resulted in corruption and periods of
mob rule.89 Cicero makes the interesting observation that tribuneships help diminish the
volatility of mob rule by providing ordinary people with leaders who can discipline the mob and
prevent it from acting irrationally. For Cicero, the reduction of the dangers of mob rule justified
the modest loss of control by patricians over policy outcomes.90
E. Criminal Judicial Process
For most of the history of the Republic, Romans did not have permanent courts; instead,
tribunals were established on an ad hoc basis to investigate and try people suspected of particular
crimes.91 Starting in the third century, the murky details about Roman criminal procedure
become clearer. Tribunes, aediles, and quaestors prosecuted defendants in assemblies;
defendants mounted a defense; and the assembly voted to convict or acquit.92 In the second
century and later, permanent courts were established where prosecutions were conducted by
private citizens while magistrates presided as judges, and juries composed of equites and/or
senators rendered verdicts.93
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F. Rights and Constitutional Change
Roman constitutional law did not contain judicially enforceable individual rights in a
modern sense. Nonetheless, there were recognizable rights, which might be called constitutional
or political rights.94 One such right, which can be found in the Twelve Tables, was that a Roman
citizen cannot be executed without a trial.95 This right seems to have been taken very seriously.
Roman citizens were rarely punished by execution at all. Cicero, as consul, did order the
execution of several Roman citizens without a trial, citing emergency. But although his decision
was supported at the time by the senate, he was later threatened with prosecution for this act and
was driven into exile.96
Other rights included the right to participate in assemblies, or in general to political
participation;97 the right to occupy the various magistracies; and perhaps various rights to
judicial process. Citizens threatened with coercion by magistrates had the right to appeal to
popular assemblies or the tribunes (provocatio).98 After permanent courts were established, the
right to provocatio became a right to judicial process. This right is thought to be a precursor of
habeas corpus.99
II. Analysis
A. The Literature on Roman Constitutionalism
In trying to explain the development of the Roman constitution, historians emphasize two
themes: Romans’ fear of executive power, and the conflict between the elites and the masses.
The fear of executive power explains the multitude of checks and balances in the Roman
constitution. The conflict between the elites and the masses explains why certain institutions
were oriented toward one group or the other.
The Republic emerged from a rebellion against a monarchical system, and Romans
sought to prevent a relapse. It was for this reason that the Roman constitution established such a
weak executive. Two consuls shared power with each other, and with lesser magistrates who
had independent sources of power. The consuls could not make laws without popular approval;
they could not punish people without securing the consent of a jury. They could serve only oneyear terms, which prevented them from consolidating power and establishing permanent
dictatorships. They were subject to oversight by the senate, and interference from religious
figures. These urgent constitutional efforts to check executive power lend poignancy to the
collapse of republican institutions and their replacement with an absolute monarchy in the first
century B.C.
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The other theme is the conflict between the elites and the masses—or to be more precise,
the conflict between patricians and wealthy plebeians (often equites) who sought to maintain the
status quo, and the ordinary plebeians and their occasional patrician leader who sought to
redistribute wealth and power to the masses. The first group came to be known as the optimates,
the second as the populares. In the early centuries of the Republic, the consuls and other
magistrates were subject to the authority of the Senate, which was dominated by the elites. And
most offices were open only to patricians. But the elites needed the support of ordinary people
who supplied the bulk of manpower for military adventures and who were otherwise a potential
source of instability. To secure their support, the patricians yielded more and more rights to the
plebeians over the centuries. By the late Republic, certain offices were reserved for plebeians—
such as the tribuneship—while most other offices were open to members of both classes. The
plebeian assembly could even make law binding on the entire population.
That class conflict was central to Roman politics is the settled wisdom among
historians.100 The ancient sources suggest a long-term trend in favor of the people. However,
how much power the patricians actually yielded to the lower class over time is the subject of
considerable dispute. On the one hand, patron-client relationships persisted throughout the entire
period: if ordinary people depended on the nobles for subsidies, contacts, advice, and other
benefits, they might not have been able to exercise much political independence.101 It took a vast
amount of wealth to conduct election campaigns (which frequently involved bribery) and hold
offices. It was not just that magistrates were unpaid; they also were expected to use their own
funds for the public good. A small number of noble families dominated the governing class for
centuries; families maintained their political power by entering alliances with each other, often
ratified through the marriage of their children. These families also dominated the religious cults,
which had a great deal of influence over political life.102 Plebeians wealthy enough to win office
often had the conservative outlook of the patricians.103 Cicero frequently gives the impression
that the tribuneship and other institutions that favor the plebeians were granted to them in
response to popular pressure but did not actually matter. The public was happy with the
constitutional forms of political power, which could cause annoyance but not affect political
outcomes in a substantial way.104
On the other hand, the plebeians had the significant advantage of numbers. And, indeed,
the poorest of the plebeians exercised disproportionate influence through the threat of street
violence: only a fraction of Roman citizens actually lived in Rome and those citizens were
among the very poorest.105 Patricians needed the support of plebeians because they supplied the
soldiers so important for Rome’s defense and imperial glory. Many plebeians did attain high
office—and both plebeian and patrician politicians rose to power by appealing to plebeian
interests. Elections were meaningful; assemblies mattered. Aside from the changes in the
Roman constitution that progressively favored the plebeians, significant substantive laws were
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enacted that benefited plebeians—from land reform to the distribution of free food. Patron-client
relationships, bribery, and private financing of public goods can also be reinterpreted as
reflections of plebeian power. Why would patrician politicians risk bankruptcy to pay off
plebeians if they had no political power?106 The fact that plebeians secured substantive laws that
benefited them, and that their efforts to secure these laws usually respected constitutional forms,
suggests that the Roman political system was not a pure oligarchy. One might call it democratic
republic that heavily favored an aristocracy or an oligarchy with significant democratic elements.
The two themes—fear of executive power and the conflict between the elites and the
masses—are closely linked in Roman history. Roman elites feared popular demagogues from
their own class—individuals who could amass power by promising to redistribute wealth from
the nobles to the plebeians and hence securing their support in the assemblies. It seems clear that
this fear lay behind many of the constitutional norms. If those norms were respected, it would be
impossible even for a successful general or charismatic demagogue to establish a personal
dictatorship. He could not be consul for more than one year; he would have to share power with
others; as a member of the senate, he had just one vote; and so forth. The problem turned out to
be that constitutional traditions were not powerful enough to prevent this from happening.
People could obtain power through extra-constitutional means—for example, by relying on
soldiers and other supporters to threaten violence. This is what eventually happened, starting
with Sulla in 82 and culminating with Caesar. But only after more than 400 years of
extraordinary political achievement.
B. A Political Economy Perspective
1. The Agency Model
Agencies models are extremely abstract, and can be applied to any case where one person
(the agent) acts in a way that benefits another person (the principal). Typically, scholars study
cases where the principal has some way to control the agent, so then the analysis focuses on
methods the principal can use to control the agent at least cost, that is, minimize agency costs. In
the simplest models, there is a single agent and a single principal; but the models have been
extended to cases where there are multiple agents and multiple principles.
Political economy models typically simplify by treating the “government” as a single
agent and the “people” as a single principle, but of course these are abstractions, and these
assumptions are frequently relaxed. A government consists of multiple offices and institutions,
and these can be treated as separate agents; the principal might sometimes be the people or a
subset of the people or an institution like a political party or a branch of government.
In the case of Rome, the initial impulse is to treat the Roman “government” as the agent,
and the Roman “people” as the principal. The people control the government through the
constitution which is a set of self-enforcing norms that dictate what the government can do.107 I
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will generally rely on this simplification in my discussion of the Roman constitution, but I must
start by noting the many ways in which it is inaccurate.
The question of who is the principal in the Roman Republic turns out to be more difficult
than it first appears. The vast majority of people living in Rome and its territories were slaves,
women, and conquered people who had not been given citizenship. It might be more accurate to
say that the government was the agent of Roman citizens. But even this claim might not be
sustainable. Most of the people were poorly educated, and impoverished; it might be doubted
whether they could wield much control over the sophisticated and vastly wealthy elites, many of
whom exerted power through patronage and private guards and gangs. On the other hand, Rome
had a complex class structure. Patricians formed the highest class but, as so often happens with
the upper classes, they were reluctant to engage in commercial activity, and so they lost
influence to merchants and farmers who amassed wealth. These people entered the class of
equites, who had certain political privileges. “New men” like Cicero could obtain semiaristocratic status by becoming consuls. Slaves were at the very bottom, but many managed to
buy themselves out of slavery or were granted freedom by their masters. Freedmen had lower
status than the free born, but some became immensely wealthy and influential nonetheless.
People from the provinces form yet another group; they had few rights at home, when ruled by
provincial governors, but brought a different perspective and often acquired citizenship when
they came to Rome. For a class system, ordinary notions of the principal’s “ideal point” might
be inappropriate.
If, as is often claimed, Rome was an oligarchy,108 the proper assumption is that the
government served as an agent for the upper class or some segment of it—the patricians and
wealthy equites, the optimates, or perhaps a few great families. That is the impression one gets,
for example, from Cicero, who sometimes writes as though ordinary people are a hostile force
that must be propitiated by the government for the sake of the nobility; at other times, however,
he treats the people as the principal albeit one that does not, and should not, have any control
over the agent, which is wiser than they are.109 On the oligarchic view, the principal consists of
the relevant oligarchy; the government maximizes the utility of its members but also must pay
other members of society whatever the minimum is necessary to prevent them from engaging in
civil war or causing a domestic disturbance.110
The Romans themselves appeared to have yet another view of the principal: the Senate
and Populus of Rome—the Latin acronym is SPQR.111 This name implies two principals—the
Senate and the people. These two principals are separate yet share sovereignty; compare “we the
people” in the United States and the Athenian demos, which imply a single principal. One
suspects that “Senate” stands in for the upper class—the patrician and wealthy plebeian families
that dominated Rome. Imagine, then, that two principals form a joint venture and expect the the
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governmental agents to serve their joint interests. This again suggests a state with a form of
government that lies somewhere between oligarchy and democracy.
Similar complications arise when we turn our attention to the agent. It is at best a rough
approximation to say that Rome had a “government.” It lacked the enormous, permanent,
hierarchical bureaucracy that is the essential character of government in modern states. (It did,
however, have a large army, albeit sometimes supplemented by forces paid out of the personal
funds of individuals like Crassus during the slave revolt of 71 B.C., and toward the end of the
Republic, mainly loyal to its commanders, who rewarded soldiers with booty.) As we have seen,
the government comprised officials who were not require to cooperate with each other and were
not subject to the control of a single person or institution. Magistrates could not rely on a police
force to keep order, and often resorted to private guards, private gangs, and even private armies.
Still, it seems fair to say that over time the Roman government acted in a largely consistent and
coherent way, thanks in large part to the senate and perhaps the small size of the elite.
The Roman government, like governments at all times and places, did two things: it
supplied public goods and it redistributed wealth. The public goods included security against
external enemies; the rewards of conquest, including loot, tribute, and taxation; suppression of
rebellion; the maintenance of public order; the construction and maintenance of roads, sewer
systems, viaducts, and other infrastructure; adjudication of private disputes; and enforcement of
property and contract rights. This type of public-good provision fits easily into the principalagent model. The various cleavages among the population manifested themselves mainly in
distributional conflict. Everyone agreed on the need for security; they disagreed about who
should pay for it. Everyone welcomed conquest, but disagreed about how the spoils should be
distributed. These distributional conflicts led to constitutional controversies because when
ordinary people did not get what they regarded as their fair share, they sought more
representation in government or stronger roles for their representatives. Nonetheless, everyone
had an interest in a government that would maximize the social surplus.
My focus, however, will be agency costs. The political economy literature identifies a
number of ways of reducing agency costs. I will focus on (1) methods for selecting government
officials; (2) division of powers among offices and institutions; and (3) rewarding and
sanctioning government officials.
2. Selection of Government Officials
Government agents such as magistrates may make decisions that are contrary to the
public interest because they lack competence or because they have preferences that deviate from
those of the principal. The Roman constitution addressed this problem in three ways:
qualification rules for office; elections; and screening by the censors.
The major qualification rules were the age restrictions and the cursus honorum. These
rules ensured that young, inexperienced people could not hold high office, and thus reduced the
risk that an incompetent person might be elected. The cursus honorum ensured that people with
mainstream preferences became consul, for people with idiosyncratic preferences were unlikely
to win multiple elections.
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Likewise, elections are a straightforward method for aggregating information and
preferences. Suppose that the competence and political preferences of candidates are private
information, but individuals can make inferences about this information on the basis of their
prior behavior. Elections are efficient mechanisms for aggregating this information as long as
people vote independently. One feature of Roman elections that may have worked against this
function, however, was that voting was public and often sequential rather than simultaneous: one
tribe or century votes first; its vote is publicly recorded as a yea or nay for a particular candidate;
then another tribe or century votes. The later voters might rationally herd;112 indeed, herding
was encouraged by the perverse superstition in tribal assemblies that the first tribe, which was
selected by lot, reflected the will of the gods, and so subsequent tribes should follow it.113 In
later years, the secret ballot was introduced, so that voters could not be intimidated by the
powerful; this may also have dampened herd behavior.
Qualification rules and elections are in tension. If qualification rules restrict who can be
elected, the people do not have unfettered choice. From time to time, voters suspended
qualification rules so that exceptionally talented individuals could be appointed at an early age or
without previously occupying an office in the cursus honorum. However, usually the
qualification rules were respected. Senators were indirectly elected. Although appointed by
consuls or censors, they were not eligible for appointment unless they had served as a magistrate
in the past, which means that they had won an election. This is one way of reconciling the
tension between popular sovereignty and the republican principle that only virtuous people
should hold office. In the United States, this tension was resolved in another way: Americans
could not vote directly for senators or the president—state legislatures and the electoral college
served as mediating institutions.
Fears that elections would result in bad choices also may have accounted for the voting
structure. Both the centuriate and tribal assemblies were biased in favor of the wealthy. One
might believe that the wealthy, educated class selects magistrates more wisely than the illiterate
masses do. On the other hand, the elites are not likely to choose magistrates who serve the
interests of the masses, and they might not understand those interests in any event. And not all
common people were illiterate; many (including slaves) were highly educated. The Roman
voting system was a compromise, weighted in favor of the wealthy but permitting the masses to
have influence when the wealthy were divided.
The American constitution has many fewer eligibility requirements—the most notable
one is the rule that the president must be a natural born citizen and at least the age of 35. One
could imagine a cursus honorum, one requiring, for example, that a person serve as governor (or
senator) before becoming president, and member of the House (or mayor or alderman) before
becoming governor or senator. Such a rule would reduce the risk that unqualified people reach
high office, but it would also limit democratic choice in a way that surely would be considered
unacceptable.
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The difference can be attributed to the more fluid political environment that existed in
ancient times. Then, it was possible for a talented young man from a prominent family to
achieve military success early in his career, and amass wealth and influence while still in his
twenties (or even teens). Such a person might harbor dictatorial ambitions and possess the
means to achieve them, while lacking the temperament and experience for republican politics.
By contrast, wealth and military glory are not straightforward paths to the presidency in the
United States. Unlike in ancient Rome, no one is wealthy enough to finance whole armies (as
Crassus, Pompey, and Caesar could); and military glory is rare and usually comes only to elderly
generals who have gradually moved up the ranks over the course of a long career. As a result,
American politics are dominated by civilian career politicians who obtain prominence through
compromise and consensus-building. Eligibility rules that emphasize age and experience are
unnecessary.
3. Division and Limitation of Powers
Governance can be divided along two dimensions: policy domain (war, public order,
games, and so forth) and type of power (legislative, executive, judicial). The U.S. founders
divided the government by power—Congress has the legislative power, the president has
executive power, and the judiciary has the judicial power—while also assigning some
duplicative powers and imposing some restrictions on policy domain. The Roman constitution,
by contrast, is divided (roughly) by policy domain. Consuls and praetors had authority over war
and public security; quaestors over finances; censors over the census; aediles over public
infrastructure and games; and so forth. Again, there was some overlap. But the Roman
constitution did not make a fetish of separation of powers. Most of the magistrates had
legislative, executive, and judicial powers: they made policy within broad legal constraints,
executed it, and interpreted the law.
The Roman system had a number of advantages.114 First, the structure of the
magistracies limited the amount of mischief that a single officeholder could do. If an
incompetent or preference-outlier is elected to an office, he can produce problems only within
his jurisdiction. Having no authority over games, an incompetent praetor cannot put on bad
games. If some fraction of elected magistrates are incompetent, then the effect of distributing
power over multiple magistrates is to reduce the variance of policy outcomes. By contrast, a
single executive office produces consistently good outcomes when a competent person holds the
office and consistently bad outcomes when an incompetent person holds the office.
Second, the Roman system established relatively clear lines of authority, in this way
easing the burden on the public to monitor and sanction officeholders. Because the aedile is
responsible for games, the public can evaluate an aedile on the basis of the success of the games.
As a result, the public learns about the abilities of the aedile, and can reward him with future
offices, or sanction him by denying him future offices. A consul responsible for defense of the
city will be judged on the basis of whether the defense fails or succeeds. By contrast, in the
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American system lines of responsibility are not always so clear.115 When crime increases, it is
hard to know whether to blame the executive for inadequate enforcement, the legislature for
insufficiently tough laws, or the judiciary for excessive protection of procedural rights. Thus, in
the Roman system, it was easier for the people to evaluate, and hence to reward and punish,
officeholders on the basis of their public acts.116
Third, the Roman system nonetheless did provide for checks that ensured that projects
went ahead only if they had sufficient political support. If a consul is tempted to enact a law that
favors the elites, then a tribune or the other consul can veto it, and indeed a popular assembly can
refuse to approve it. As a result, an implicit supermajoritarian rule holds: policies will be
implemented only if officeholders representing a broad array of interests favors it.
Supermajoritarian rules can be justified on the ground that they prevent redistributive politics
while permitting government to produce public goods when decision costs are low.117 It is
impossible to know whether supermajoritarian rules served this purpose in Rome or merely
entrenched the status quo—a question to which I will return. For now, the interesting
comparison is between the Roman and American systems of checking. In the American system,
a branch of government cannot check another branch when that branch acts solely within its
domain. So, for example, the judiciary does not try to check prosecutorial discretion. In the
Roman system, such checking is possible. If the purpose of checks and balances is to ensure that
a supermajoritarian element exists in policymaking, then the American system is hard to justify.
There is no particular reason to limit checking to cases where the three different types of powers
must come into play in order for political outcomes to be achieved.
While Madison and Montesquieu complained that the failure to separate legislative,
executive, and judicial power results in “tyranny,” the usual complaint about the Roman system
is that the division of powers caused gridlock.118 Again, let us compare the American and the
Roman system. Simplifying greatly, the American president can respond to an emergency by
either drawing on existing statutory authority or obtaining a single authorization from Congress,
and then taking whatever actions seem necessary, subject only to a judicial check against
arbitrary arrests and similar police actions. A Roman consul could respond to an emergency
without senate authorization (though senate authorization would be prudent), and could, in
principle, establish policy and use coercion in order to achieve it. Yet at all times, he would need
to contend with objections from the other consul and the ten tribunes, and eventually he would
be required to grant people trials. It seems that, on the whole, the American executive has more
freedom of action than the Roman consul did. Rules restricting consuls to one-year terms, and
limiting the frequency with which an individual could hold consulships and other offices, further
weakened the executive in the Republic by preventing talented individuals from accumulating
political power.
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Brennan and Hamlin note that American-style separation of powers reproduces at the
political level the dual monopoly problem analyzed in the industrial organization literature.119
Suppose the government produces a public good but charges a “price” in the form of taxes. A
single government official would set a monopoly price; but if two government officials must
agree to the project, then the first (akin to a supplier) will charge a monopoly price to the second
(akin to a distributor) who will then treat the first official’s consent as, in effect, a costly input,
and pass the cost along to the taxpayer plus an additional markup reflecting the second official’s
monopoly power. Because of the principle of collegiality in the Roman constitution, this
problem might seem even more significant than in the American constitution. A consul who
seeks to implement a project must bribe the other consul not to veto it. However, there are two
competing factors. First, the consuls were individuals and could bargain very easily with each
other—much more easily than the president can bargain with Congress, which consists of two
houses, each with a multitude of members. Second, the consuls typically came from the same
class, and often were bound by family and clan alliances. From the standpoint of the
Brennan/Hamlin model, separation of powers in Rome appears less damaging than it is in the
United States, at least until the last century of Rome’s existence. Gridlock and the other
pathologies of separation of powers could be avoided through bargaining in a small, homogenous
political class.
The Roman constitution also addressed the weakness of executive power in more direct
ways. Magistrates such as consuls, proconsuls, and praetors enjoyed broadest powers when
outside Rome, while on campaigns or when administering provinces. In these situations, there
were relatively fewer concerns that the magistrates would abuse their powers because they had
less authority over Romans (aside from soldiers, travelers, and administrators). For that reason,
they could be subject to fewer limits.
In addition, magistrates could not be everywhere at once, and a magistrate could not veto
the action of another magistrate unless in his presence. The constraints of time and space thus
could facilitate governance, albeit only as a result of contingency. Magistrates in the same
college also divided up responsibilities temporally (consuls took turns with authority on a
monthly basis) and by domain, in this way avoiding direct conflict but possibly interfering with
continuity of governance.
Further, the senate played an important role in coordinating the magistrates. However,
the senate was not an elected body; as a result, senators, who surely reflected the interests of the
wealthy, had an impact on policy outcomes through their influence on the assignment of roles to
magistrates and their resolution of disputes between them.
Finally, the Roman constitution had a safety valve in the office of the dictator. The
dictator did not have to coordinate with other magistrates; unlike the consul, the dictator did not
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have to contend with another person simultaneously holding the same office. Of course, such
unbridled authority could be abused. The further solution to this problem was that dictators
could hold office for only six months. Abuse was therefore time-limited. And because the
dictator was selected by the consuls who were broadly responsible for the security of the
Republic, the dictator would likely be a person who was experienced and enjoyed a fair amount
of trust. However, even these protections may not have been enough. From the second century
B.C. through Sulla, the political class avoided reliance on dictators and instead the senate
authorized a consul to take extraordinary actions during times of emergency. As an elected
official, the consul may have had more trust among the public.
4. Term Limits
The magistrates suffered under severe term limits of, in most cases, one year. They could
not run for reelection, and there seemed to have been a presumption, on occasion disregarded,
that a Roman could hold an office he had held before only after a long interval. In the United
States, most officeholders have longer terms—two or more years. In the national government,
only the president faces a term limit.
Scholars are generally critical of term limits because they prevent competent
officeholders from staying in office and reduce the incentive of individuals to run for office in
the first place.120 In Rome, term limits may have been attractive for several reasons. First, term
limits prevented consuls from acquiring monarchical powers. They had to share power over
time, which meant that dictatorial acts undertaken their term of office could be reversed.
Second, term limits also prevented officeholders from accumulating political capital, which
would enable them to acquire excessive power. A person who held office for only one year
would be quickly forgotten.
The Roman system may have worked well enough for a period of time, but its chief flaw
became apparent in the last century. Because no civilian politician could amass much power
through office, and perhaps because none had strong incentives to discharge their official duties
competently, none could stand up to the military leaders who earned glory at battle and could
offer loot to soldiers and civilians who supported them. Military posts was not term-limited; and
so successful generals could earn a popular following over a long period of time. These military
leaders included Marius, Sulla, Pompey, and Caesar, and they were the dominant figures during
the last century of the Republic’s existence. By contrast, most of the consuls of that era—aside
from these figures and Cicero—were undistinguished.
5. Rewarding and Sanctioning Government Officials
Principals cannot reward and sanction agents unless they can observe either the agent’s
performance or the outcome (payoff) of the agent’s performance. Roman constitutional norms
provided plenty of opportunities for such observation. Senatorial debates, assembly meetings,
and judicial proceedings were all public and seem to have been attended by a great many people.
However, physical structure put limits on the extent of public monitoring. Rome had a
120

See Timothy Besley and Anne Case, Does Electoral Accountability Affect Economic Policy Choices? Evidence
from Gubernatorial Term Limits, 110 Q.J. ECON. 769 (1995).

24

population in the hundreds of thousands but in certain public spaces, only tens of thousands of
people could have been present.121
The division of powers by policy domain also lent itself to public monitoring. If the
games were unsatisfactory, then everyone knew to blame the aedile with the responsibility for
them. If a military campaign ended in failure, then the relevant consul or praetor could be held
accountable. In addition, intense competition for political offices gave candidates with access to
private information incentives to disclose such information when it harmed opponents. Finally,
the requirement that citizens be out of office for two years between magistracies ensured that the
medium-term consequences of their actions could be observed before they were elected to a new
office.
But what were the rewards and sanctions, concretely? Roman politicians sought honor
and wealth. Many politicians inherited a distinguished family name that imposed burdens and
conferred opportunities. A family name is a form of human capital that one inherits rather than
earns. Because Romans gave some deference to people from old families, a distinguished family
name provided its bearer with political opportunities but also subjected him to a kind of bond. If
he ended up a political failure, he disgraced his ancestors and deprived his descendants of the
opportunities that he enjoyed. Maybe, these psychological factors gave Roman politicians longer
time-horizons than those of American politicians.
To obtain honor, a Roman politician must contribute to the glory and prosperity of Rome.
If he is an aedile, he must stage impressive games. If he is a consul, he must win military
victories or keep the peace. Cicero won honor by suppressing the Catalina conspiracy. The
highest honor was the triumph, a spectacular victory parade that enhanced the leader’s prestige
among the public, which one could earn only by being a military leader, and most (but not all)
military leaders were consuls (or praetors). But one could become a consul or praetor only if one
first was a quaestor. Thus, the Roman system harnessed the thirst for military victory to more
mundane civic needs such as the management of public finances.
Money also played an important role in Roman politics. Officeholders were not paid, and
were often expected to finance projects out of their own wealth. Many ambitious politicians
resorted to borrowing; if they did not repay their debts, they could be ruined. At the same time,
offices presented opportunities for gain. A consul who was given command of an army received
a large share of the booty if he gained victory, and provincial governorships—the reward to
consuls after their term of office expired—tendered semi-legal opportunities for their occupants
to enrich themselves at the expense of the governed. In these ways, high offices offered
pecuniary awards as well as honors, aligning politician’s incentives to do well with the selfinterest of the Roman people.
But only partially. A magistrate who borrowed in order to win an election, and could
only repay those debts by winning a military victory, had strong incentives to win a military
victory. But he might also plan and execute his military campaign in a way that yields the
highest gain for himself rather than for Rome—for example, targeting a weak but wealthy enemy
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rather than a powerful enemy that posed more of a threat. Similarly, governors who milked the
provinces for their own benefit set the stage for civil strife in the future.
The Romans were aware of these problems. Consuls sought triumphs—the highest
political honor—by winning battles, and this might cause the distortion in incentives noted
above,122 but the senate had the authority to confer or deny them, and it could have used that
authority to dissuade consuls from pursuing military victories of no value for the Roman
Republic. Magistrates and governors who abused their office could be prosecuted after the term
of office expired.123 However, many prosecutions were thought to be politically motivated, the
result of private feuds. Thus, whether the availability of prosecution reduced rather than
increased agency costs depends on how impartial the judicial system was. If jurors could be
persuaded to convict only when the magistrate abused the office, then prosecution would have
improved magistrates’ incentives. But if jurors could be easily bribed, or swayed by temporary
political passions, then magistrates would have regarded the prospect of trial as a cost of doing
business, but would have not have changed their behavior in response to it.
Censors could remove senators who committed crimes, became bankrupt, or violated
serious moral norms. In the U.S. system, the Senate (and the House) have the responsibility for
policing their members. Both institutions resolve one set of agency problems but create new
ones. The prospect of removal might cause agents to act in the public interest, but the people
with the power to remove do not necessarily want them to act in the public interest. Elections of
censors helped mitigate the latter problem but would not have been sufficient. Perhaps for this
reason, the Romans seem to have been nervous about the powers of the censors, and their terms,
although nominally five years, were shortened from time to time.
The short term of office might also be a way of limiting the damage that an incompetent
official could do. But it also limited the good that a competent official could do. In addition,
office attracts talented people to the extent that they can obtain rents; the shorter the office, the
fewer the rents, and thus the smaller the incentive for entering political life.
Compared to the American system, Roman politicians had a great deal more at stake in
politics. A successful political career resulted in fame, riches, and respect. A failed political
career could result in death (at the hands of mobs and even political competitors) or exile (after a
politically motivated prosecution), and certainly bankruptcy and disgrace. The high stakes must
have given Roman politicians very strong incentives to perform well. However, they also had
perverse consequences. Because one could be prosecuted only after leaving office, magistrates
had incentives to forestall such prosecutions by taking legal action against their enemies or (in
the case of Caesar) refusing to leave office or (in the case of Catalina) fomenting rebellion.
These perverse incentives were held in check for most of the Republic’s history, but they
contributed to its collapse.
In the United States, politics is not a life and death struggle. The low stakes ensure that
power is given up voluntarily and transfers of power are peaceful. Elected officials have weaker
incentives to rig the game in the incumbent’s favor. If incentives to perform well are less strong,
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by the same token the incentives to challenge the constitutional system are weaker, and so
political instability is rarer.
6. The Role of the Senate
The system of independent magistrates creates a problem of coordination. If there are
multiple aediles, which aedile is responsible for the games? If there are two consuls, which one
will take command in the east and which will take command in the west? These are problems of
coordination which are characteristic of unbundled executives.124 The senate helped coordinate
magistrates. Sometimes, the senate presided while magistrates drew lots. At other times, the
senate directly appointed magistrates to undertake particular tasks. By issuing decrees that
reflected general policies, the senate also provided a means for magistrates to coordinate their
actions.
The senate also played an important role in maintaining the continuity of government.
Because most magistrates had one-year terms, they might have taken a short-term view toward
Rome’s interests.125 The influence of the senate assured people that policies adopted by
magistrates extended for greater than one year. For example, creditors want assurance that debts
undertaken in one year will be repaid in a later year. By endorsing the actions of magistrates in
one period, the senate led people to expect that those actions would not be repudiated by
subsequent magistrates.
For the senate to serve these functions, it would need to be able to control the magistrates.
It had several methods for doing this. First, the senate bestowed honors on magistrates. For
example, the senate determined whether a military leader received a triumph. Second, the senate
initiated criminal proceedings against magistrates who abused their office. Third, the senate had
control over public finances, and could penalize magistrates by refusing to fund them. Fourth,
senators were rich and influential, and magistrates would have wanted to maintain good
relationships with them for personal as well as political reasons. Fifth, the senate had power to
influence the allocation of tasks among magistrates, so magistrates who acted badly could be
deprived of appealing (and often lucrative) posts and projects.126 To be sure, it is possible that
magistrates could ignore these assignments. But the magistrates faced a coordination game
where they could end up with very low payoffs if they engaged in the same tasks as other
magistrates. Tradition gave the senate the role of coordinator (focal point), and it would have
been difficult for magistrates to break out of this equilibrium.
In performing these functions, the senate diluted the control of the people over the
magistrate through elections and popular approval of legislation. We might imagine a model,
then, in which the people are the principal, and the principal controls the agents (the magistrates)
both directly and through the senate. Modern business corporations have a roughly analogous
structure. Shareholders control corporate policy both directly (certain actions like mergers must
be approved by shareholders) and through an independent institution, the board of directors.
Both the Roman senate and the board of directors enjoy a certain level of independence from the
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ultimate stakeholders. Senators are selected by censors; directors are selected by CEOs subject
to a rubber stamp by shareholders. These forms of indirect representation raise agency costs.
Censors do not necessarily act in the interest of the people (though they are elected themselves),
and directors do not necessarily act in the interest of shareholders. The de facto and de jure
qualifications for the senate also ensured that it was not a representative body. On the other
hand, because senators were drawn from ex-magistrates, they were politicians who had in the
past proven that they were acceptable to the people in elections.
Another feature of the senate was that it was a large body—generally in the neighborhood
of 300 people—and hence subject to all the problems of collective decisionmaking. Senators
had an incentive to free-ride on information-gathering and deliberation, and were vulnerable to
agenda-setting by the magistrates, who could introduce bills or proposals and make take-it-orleave-it offers. These factors suggest a weak and passive body. However, some historians argue
that the senate was controlled by a core group of old and powerful families.127 If that was the
case, then the senate served a more effective coordinating and disciplinary role, but was less
representative of the interests of the people.
The U.S. Senate is often called a millionaire’s club, but it hardly resembles the Roman
Senate at all. It does not serve the interests of the elites in any clear sense; it is certainly not
understood to have that function, as the Senate in Rome was. The United States has a single
principal (“we the people”) rather than a dual principal (SPQR). This is surely the result of the
fact that the United States does not have clearly demarcated classes; as a result, it would make
little sense to give different government institutions the responsibility of advancing the interests
of one class or the other.
7. Judicial Process
From a modern perspective, it is strange that a magistrate, who has executive and
legislative power, could also serve as a judge. As judge, the magistrate would have strong
incentives to favor political allies and harm political adversaries rather than respect the rule of
law.
Although the details of judicial procedure in public law cases are murky, there appear to
have been a number of checks on this type of behavior. It appears that magistrates never or
rarely initiated the cases in which they served as judges. Cases were initiated by the senate and
the popular assemblies, or by different magistrates. The jury was an important check as well.
Not only would acquittal protect the defendant; it would also give rise to an inference that the
magistrate had wasted public resources pursuing a politically vindictive case. It also does not
appear that Roman judges had as much power as modern judges do. The law was mostly
customary and the jury had a great deal of discretion to decide cases as it saw fit. However,
because jurors were selected from the upper class, the system as a whole worked in favor of the
wealthier and better connected.
8. Popular Sovereignty
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Rome had a mixed system of representative and direct democracy. People voted for
magistrates, who conducted the government’s business; but they also voted on bills proposed by
the magistrates. The system is in many ways appealing. The people appoint agents to draft and
propose bills but retain the right to veto bills that are contrary to their interests.
The U.S. founders rejected direct democracy in favor of a system of representative
democracy, where people vote for representatives who both propose and vote on bills. Such a
system would appear to increase agency costs; why then was it selected?
There are a number of problems with the Roman system. First, the direct democracy
component of it did not really eliminate agency costs. Magistrates still had agenda setting
power, enabling them to propose bills that the public preferred to the status quo but not to any
number of possible alternative bills. A small and collegial body, by contrast, can set up rules to
mitigate agenda-setting. Second, most Romans were illiterate, and the bills had to be read to
them. It is hard to believe that the public was able to understand complex laws, which means
that magistrates could not propose complex but important laws or (more likely) that people voted
on laws they did not understand. Debate involving thousands of people was also impossible, so
the political contribution of the people was limited. Third, people could not be, and were not,
compelled to attend assemblies. This probably meant that only people with low opportunity
costs or a special interest in proposed bills attended assemblies. These people were not
necessarily representative of the population as a whole, which means that many laws were
enacted that served special interests rather than the public interest.
Direct democracy today can be found in some states like California. Systems of direct
democracy have a poor reputation for reasons related to the problems with direct democracy in
Rome. People often do not understand the proposals they vote on, and may not think carefully
about how they interact with existing legislation.
C. The Fall of the Roman Republic
Republican institutions decayed over the last century B.C. A series of dictatorships
interspersed with civil war and periods of renewed assertion by the senate finally ended in 27
B.C., when Octavian became consul and was granted title of Augustus. Although the senate
continued to exist, as did many of the constitutional forms, Augustus had immense political
power as a result of his wealth, his control of armies, and his popularity. Over time, he and his
successors would receive de jure recognition of their imperial authority.
Many of the ancients blamed the collapse of the Roman republic on decadence and the
corruption of public morals that resulted from the vast wealth that flowed into Rome its
conquests.128 Sallust and some modern historians point to changes in military organization. In
the earlier Republic, soldiers were recruited from among propertied farmers; in the later
Republic, commanders (beginning with Marius) recruited them from the proletariat.129 Thanks
to the immense rewards from a successful military campaign, soldiers transferred their loyalty
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from the Republic to particular military commanders such as Marius, Sulla, Pompey, and Caesar.
Polybius and Machiavelli believed that the Roman constitution had lost its “balance” between
monarchical, aristocratic, and popular elements as a result of the expansion of the power of the
plebeians.130 In the same spirit, Montesquieu argued that Roman conquests resulted in an influx
of defeated populations, who did not share the interests of the Romans.131 Modern historians
concur that Rome’s conquest of foreign countries enriched the wealthy while generating a larger
class of poor people who were absorbed into the state; the tensions between these classes
eventually could not be contained in a republican system.
The historical debate was dominated by the image of the balanced constitution introduced
by Polybius, who himself drew on themes in Plato, Aristotle, and other philosophers. But there
are two problems with the idea of the balanced constitution. First, it draws on an old notion that
society is divided into classes that pursue their class interests rather than the modern notion that
society simply consists of individuals who pursue their self-interest.132 Polybius imagined an
aristocracy (“the few”) and the common people (“the many”), and an inherent struggle between
them over social resources. This is certainly not an accurate picture of society today; it is not a
good starting point for political analysis even for the ancient world. People then as now had
individual projects and ambitions. They lived in a class system but there is no evidence that the
classes acted as unified agents. The classes were relatively fluid. Many plebeians joined the
ruling class, becoming “nobles,” a more comprehensive group of wealthy and influential people
than the “patricians.” Many patricians sought political power by offering leadership to the
plebes.
Second, the idea of balance is ambiguous. Putting aside the extreme cases of absolute
monarchy and mob rule, one cannot evaluate the “balance” of a constitution because the different
elements do not have “weights” that can be compared along a common metric. When the U.S.
senate became popularly elected, the many gained at the expense of the few, but did the
constitution become unbalanced as a result or just more perfectly balanced? Such a question is
impossible to answer. Polybius believed that the Roman constitution became “unbalanced,” as
the senate lost power to popular assemblies, but one could just as easily argue that the
constitution became more balanced as otherwise the senate was not adequately checked.
The better approach is to think about constitutions in terms of whether they generate good
political outcomes—order, security, prosperity, and the like. The U.S. founders, although
captivated by the ancient notion of balance, did make arguments along these lines. They rejected
the Roman elements of direct democracy, which resulted in sometimes hysterical and
inconsistent political outcomes, and favored the senate, which is portrayed as a sober deliberative
body.133 Hamilton criticized the division of the executive between two consuls because it led to
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conflict.134 Madison criticized the concentration of separate legislative, executive, and judicial
powers in individual magistrates because it led to “tyranny.”135
The conventional wisdom beginning with Polybius is that the Roman constitution failed
because the public obtained too much power. It foolishly marginalized the senate—the only
continuous deliberative body—and put its faith in demagogues and tyrants. However, the
opposite view seems more plausible. The senate refused to acknowledge that a de facto shift in
political power had occurred as a result of the expansion of the population, and insisted on
maintaining its de jure privileges rather than yielding constitutional power to the people, except
in small grudging squibs. The elites became vastly wealthier during the time period as a result of
conquest, which produced an influx of valuable goods including slaves that accrued mostly to the
upper class. The increase in the number of slaves both increased the value of farmland, which
was mostly held by the elites, and reduced the value of free labor, resulting in the reduction of
wages and unemployment. Meanwhile, many Roman soldiers lost their farms as a result of war,
political disruption, and their long tenure in the field. All this exacerbated the conflict between
the lower and upper classes. To maintain power, the elites would have had to (for example)
allow the senate to become a more representative body that reflected the interests and enjoyed
the loyalty of the masses. The senate also kept the magistrates weak because it feared that
powerful magistrates would redistribute wealth to the people; but in the process it also failed to
give magistrates the power to keep order and prosecute wars in an efficient manner. All of this
gave rise to a demand for powerful figures who would serve the interests of the masses and
engage in efficient governance. A number of individuals saw the opportunity to obtain power by
appealing to the masses and adopting redistributive programs. These included Tiberius and
Gaius Gracchus from roughly 132-121 B.C.; Gaius Marius, who was consul seven times between
107 and 86 B.C.; Lucius Sergius Catilina and Publius Clodius Pulcher in succeeding years; and
Julius Caesar, who was consul in 59 and then consul or dictator from 49 to his assassination in
44 B.C. It seems apparent that, backed by soldiers and plebes, these individuals had political
power that greatly exceeded the constitutional authority that they could obtain. Because the
senate and other vested interests blocked peaceful constitutional change, constitutional change
occurred through violence.
The transition to absolute monarchy is treated as a tragic failure of self-government, but it
should also be kept in mind that the monarchy ended the civil wars, kept the peace, and initiated
a new era of conquest and prosperity for the Romans. It may well be the case that monarchy was
the better constitutional form for the times—for a much larger and more diverse Rome than
existed in the first few centuries of the Republic. After all, monarchy would be the dominant
constitutional form for large states for the next two millennia, so it is likely that it had significant
advantages over the republican form of government. It seems likely that as Rome became more
populous and heterogeneous, the cumbersome republican system could not arrange transfers
from policy winners to policy losers whenever the government created a new public good. Too
many veto points blocked the way. A dictator can more easily arrange for transfers, and can stay
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in power as long as he makes sufficient transfers to the policy losers.136 The major cost of
dictatorship—that the dictator favors a clique of supporters—may have been tolerable when the
alternative was either gridlock or anarchy and civil war. Maintaining order requires constant
vigilance, and flexibility that allows one to redeploy resources whenever a new threat arises.
The Republic did not have a powerful enough executive once it exceeded a certain size; by
dividing executive power among multiple offices and institutions, it created a system that was
too cumbersome to react to new threats as they arose.

Conclusion: Lessons for the U.S. Constitution
The founders of the U.S. constitution were deeply knowledgeable about the constitution
of the Roman Republic and heavily influenced by it.137 They accepted Polybius’s view that if a
constitution is not balanced, the political system will degenerate into tyranny or mob rule,138 but
they rejected the particular checks and balances of the Roman constitution. Instead, they were
persuaded by Montesquieu, and their own experiences with the state governments, that the better
approach was to divide the government into legislative, executive, and judicial branches that had
the power to check each other and the institutional motivation to maintain their authority.
With the benefit of centuries of research not available to the founders, one might worry
that the founders took the checks and balances of the Roman constitution too literally. Many
historians attribute the success of the Romans to the relatively coherent class of elites, who had a
common worldview (emphasizing conquest and imperial expansion) and could buy off the
masses through patron-client relationships and occasional redistributive laws and political
institutions. The key to success, then, was a small, homogenous population—where everyone in
the political class knew each other, and everyone could observe what everyone else was doing as
they were doing it, at least within the confines of Rome. It was the expansion of the population
after the Social Wars that finally destroyed Republican Rome, and required the replacement of
Republican institutions with the dictatorship.
The upshot is that an elaborate system of checks and balances might not be easily
transferable to the United States, which even during the founding was vastly larger, more
populous, and more heterogeneous than Rome was—and today, is even more so. Of course,
Madison, influenced by Montesquieu’s skepticism about large republics, worried about this
problem; federalism was supposed to be the solution. And indeed state constitutions did not
fetishize the separation of powers as much as the national constitution did. Over time, the
independence of the judiciary diminished in the states—judicial terms in nearly all states have
been relatively short, and electoral systems in most states kept judges in check—and party
politics overcame institutional checks and balances. So an institutional weak national
government sat atop institutionally powerful state governments. But federalism has eroded in the
United States under the pressure of scale economies that favor a national market and national
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security. Today, separation of powers is a source of frustration for both left and right, who take
turns blaming courts and Congress for impeding the policy agenda of the president, and a
frequent target in the academic literature.139 The development of Rome from a Coasean system
where the checks and balances established political entitlements that could easily be traded
among a small political elite, to one where they caused gridlock in a vast, heterogeneous
population, provides a cautionary tale for the United States. Indeed, these features of the United
States account for the erosion of separation of powers in the twentieth century.140 Fortunately,
we have advantages that the Romans lacked—notably, a free press, a wealthy, educated
citizenry, a robust party system, and a widely respected norm of political equality that extends
throughout the entire population. These hard-won cultural endowments have taken up the slack
left by the relaxation of the archaic system of checks and balances we have inherited from the
Romans.141
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